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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Cullin Sims appeals from the district court's order dismissing his Petition for Post 
Conviction Relief ("Petition"). Mr. Sims asserts he raised an issue of material fact as to 
whether his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to consult with him about moving to 
withdraw his guilty plea and file a motion to suppress following the issuance of 
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013) by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
On January 24, 2013, Mr. Sims was charged with with felony eluding, feiony 
aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (hereinafter, DUI), felony possession 
of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor resisting and obstructing law enforcement. 
(R., pp.68-70.) On April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims pleaded guilty to the aggravated DUI and the 
State dismissed the remaining charges. (R., pp.58-61.) On May 30, 2013, the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with seven and one-half years fixed, 
upon Mr. Cullen. (R., pp.71-73.) Mr. Sims timely appealed. (State's Exhibit 1.) 
Mr. Sims conviction and sentence was affirmed on appeal. See State v. Cullen Robert 
Sims, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 626 (Ct. App. July 17, 2014). 
On August 22, 2013, Mr. Sims filed his Petition asserting the his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to file: (1) an appeal his sentence; (2) a motion to suppress 
statements made by him while in the hospital in a "sub-conscious" state; and (3) a 
motion to suppress the non-consensual blood draw taken at the hospital. (R., p.5.) In 
his prayer for relief, Mr. Sims wrote, "I am asking this Court to find that my attorney was 
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ineffective for not filing the proper pre-trial [m]otions, and that the failure of that action 
has allowed me to enter a plea of guilty to a charge 'unknowingly and unintelligently."' 
(R., p.6.) In his affidavit, Mr. Sims attested: 
At the time that I was unconscious in the hospital, and without my consent, 
and without a warrant of any kind, my blood was taken from me and given 
to the Police. (Or the results of tests upon my blood). This was used as 
evidence in my criminal case to establish probable cause. 
I believe that my attorney should have filed a Motion to suppress this 
evidence. I believe that my plea of guilty is not entered into "knowingly 
and intelligently" because if my attorney would have filed a Motion to 
Suppress the evidence of the illegally taken blood or bodily fluids, and if 
the Motion would have been successful, I wou!d not have entered into a 
plea of guilty. 
I asked my attorney to perform the activities that I have described herein. 
My attorney told me that the Motion to Suppress were a waste of time, and 
my attorney would not file these Motions. 
(R., pp.10-11.) Then, in his Memorandum in Support of Petition, Mr. Sims argued that 
his case was similar to McNeely in that his blood was taken without a warrant. 
(R., pp.16-18.) Mr. Sims asked for and was appointed conflict counsel to assist in his 
post conviction action. (R., pp.20-26, 30-31.) 
The State filed an Answer and Motion for Judicial Notice, asking the district court 
to take judicial notice of the Information, Judgment and Commitment and the transcripts 
from the change of plea and sentencing hearings. (R., pp.38-40, 51-52.) The State 
then filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.101-102.) The State generally 
argued that the Petition should be dismissed because: ( 1) there was insufficient 
material and documentation to warrant an evidentiary hearing; (2) "[t]he ineffective 
assistance of counsel allegations again do not have any supporting information 
sufficient to shat that there was defective performance by the attorney handling his 
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case"; and (3) "there is zero evidence in the Petition to indicate that 'but for' the deficient 
or ineffective conduct, the results would have been different." (R., p.103.) 
On January 28, 2014, the district court entered its Summary Dismissal of 
Allegations 7.8 (failure to suppress statements) and 7.C (failure to suppress blood 
results); Notice of Hearing on 7.A (failure to appeal). (R., pp.108-117.) The district 
court concluded that: 
In reviewing all of the evidence presented for the summary dismissal, the 
Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that 
counsel's performance was deficient in not filing the alleged motions to 
suppress. The Petitioner has not shown a material issue of fact exists on 
whether the Petitioner's counsel should have filed these motions and he 
has not shown that the filing of such motions was not freely and voluntarily 
waived upon the Defendant's guilty plea. 
(R., pp.114.) Then, following an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed 
Mr. Sims' final claim of error. (R., pp.125-128.) Mr. Sims timely appealed. (R., pp.132-
134.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err in dismissing Mr. Sims' petition for post-conviction relief without 
conducting an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his trial attorney failed to consult 
with him and file a motion to suppress the results of the warrantless, non-consensual 
blood draw conducted upon him? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred In Dismissing Mr. Sims' Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Without Conducting An Evidentiary Hearing On His Claim That His Trial Attorney Failed 
To Consult With Him And File A Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Warrantless, 
Non-Consensual Blood Draw Conducted Upon Him 
A. Introduction 
Following a traffic accident, Mr. Sims was taken to the hospital and a warrantless 
blood draw was conducted upon him. On April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims entered a plea of 
guilty to aggravated DUI. On April 17, 2013, the United Supreme Court issued 
its opinion in Missouri v. McNeely which reiterated that there is no per se exception to 
the warrant requirement and cases must be 
circumstances. ~Jlr. Sims' trial attorney failed 
case, and did not move to withdraw his guilty 
results of the warrantless blood draw. For the reasons 
based on the totality of the 
McNee/y's application to his 
file a motion suppress the 
forth below, Mr. Sims asserts 
that the district court erred in dismissing his claim that his attorney was ineffective for 
failing to discuss the ramifications of McNeely, move to withdraw his guilty plea, and file 
a motion to suppress. 
B. Applicable Legal Standards 
1. Summary Dismissal Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief is civil in nature. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 
138 Idaho 76, 79-80 (2002). An application for post-conviction relief must be verified 
with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant. I .C. § 19-4903. The 
application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations, 
or must state why such supporting evidence is not included. Id. 
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The cowi may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction reiief when the 
court is satisfied the applicant is not entitled to relief and no purpose would be served by 
further proceedings. I.C. § 19-4906(b). In considering summary dismissal in a case 
where evidentiary facts are not disputecl, summary dismissal may be appropriate, 
despite the possibility of conflicting inferences, because the court alone will be 
responsible for resolving the conflict between the inferences. See State v. Yakovac, 
145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008) (addressing case where the State did not file a response to 
the petition) (citing Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519 (1982) 
{addressing case with stipulated facts).) However, where the facts are disputed, a court 
is required to accept the petitioner's unrebutted factual allegations as true, but need not 
accept the petitioner's conclusions. Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
Summary disposition on the pleadings and record is not proper if there exists a 
material issue of fact. I.C. § 19-4906. When genuine issues of material fact exist that, if 
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to relief, summary 
disposition is improper and an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Baldwin v. 
State, 145 Idaho 148, 153 (2008). 
When reviewing a district court's order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction 
relief proceeding, the reviewing court applies the same standard as that applied by the 
district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675 (2010). Therefore, on review of a 
dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court 
determines whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions 
and admissions together with any affidavits on file and liberally construes the facts and 
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 903 
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(citation omitted). The lower court's legal conclusions are reviewed de nova. Owen v. 
State, 130 Idaho 715, 716 (1997). 
C. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Trial Counsel Rendered Deficient 
Performance When He Failed To Consult With Mr. Sims, Move To Withdraw His 
Guilty Plea 1 And File A Motion To Suppress The Results Of The Warrantless, 
Non-Consensual Blood Draw Conducted Upon Him 
1. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Standards 
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may properly be brought through 
post-conviction proceedings. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765 (Ct. App. 2008). The 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant in a criminal 
case the right to counsel, which includes the effective assistance of counsel. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685-86 (1984 ). Further, the Constitution 
guarantees a fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the basic 
elements of a fair trial largely through the several provisions of the Sixth Amendment, 
including the Counsel Clause. Id. at 685. 
"When a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's 
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. The Sixth Amendment "relies ... on 
the legal profession's maintenance of standards sufficient to justify the law's 
presumption that counsel will fulfill the role in the adversary process that the 
Amendment envisions." Id. The "proper measure of attorney performance remains 
simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Id. 
In addition to proving deficient performance, in most instances a defendant also 
must prove that he was prejudiced. "The defendant must show that there is a 
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reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). 
"A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the 
outcome." Id. However, a "defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct 
more likely than not aitered the outcome in the case." Id. at 693. As was recognized by 
Justice O'Conner, the author of the Strickland opinion, in her concurring opinion in 
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), 
If a state court were to reject a prisoner's claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on the grounds that the prisoner had not established 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the result of his criminal 
proceeding would have been different, that decision would be 
"diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," and "mutually 
opposed" to our clearly established precedent because we held in 
Strickland that the prisoner need only demonstrate a "reasonable 
probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Id. at 405-06 (O'Connor, J. concurring) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696). 
2. A Material Issue Of Fact Exists On Whether Mr. Sims' Trial Failed To 
Consult With Him Regarding McNeely And Abide By His Request To File 
A Motion To Suppress 
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that the starting point of evaluating criminal 
defense counsel's conduct is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 279 (1998). 
According to the prevailing standards, defense counsel, "[a]fter informing himself or 
herself fully on the facts and the law, defense counsel should advise the accused with 
complete candor concerning all aspects of the case, including a candid estimate of the 
probable outcome." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution and Defense 
Function, (3d ed. 1991 ), Defense Function, Standard 4-5.1 (a). 
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In the instant case, on April 4, 2013, Mr. Sims entered a plea of guilty to 
aggravated DUI. (R., pp.58-60.) Then, prior to Mr. Sims' sentencing, on April 17, 2013, 
the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 
__ , 133 S.Ct. 1552 (2013), wherein the Court rejected the notion that a DUI 
investigation, by itself, justifies dispensing with the warrant requirement. In McNeely, 
the respondent was validly stopped and after declining to take a breath test, was 
arrested and taken to a nearby hospital for a blood draw. Id. at 1557-1558. At the 
hospital, Mr. McNeely refused to consent to the blood draw, but the officer ordered the 
technician to take the blood anyway. Id. The officer never attempted to secure a 
search warrant. Id. Mr. McNeely's blood alcohol content ("BAG") measured at .154 
percent. Id. McNeely's suppression motion was granted and the Missouri Supreme 
Court affirmed the lower court's order granting suppression of the BAC results, relying 
on Schmerber. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a 
split in the circuits as to whether "the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream 
establishes a per se exigency that it suffices on its own to justify and exception to the 
warrant requirement. ... " Id. at 1558. 
The McNeely Court held that it did not: "[i]n those drunk-driving investigations 
where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood sample can be 
drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy of the search, the Fourth 
Amendment mandates that they do that." Id. 133 S.Ct. at 1561. The Court first 
recognized the importance of the privacy interest at stake, holding that "absent an 
emergency, no less [than a warrant] could be required where intrusions in to the human 
body are concerned," and that the importance of a determination by a neutral and 
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detached magistrate before law enforcement is allowed to "invade another's body in 
search of evidence of guilt is indisputable and great." Id. at 1558. The Court reiterated 
what was seemingly forgotten by lower courts after Schmerber. to determine whether 
an officer faced an emergency which would justify alleviating the requirement of a 
warrant, the Court looks to the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 1559. The Court 
concluded, "[w]e hold that in drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of 
alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case sufficient to 
justify conducting a blood test without a warrant." Id. at 1568. Following McNeely, the 
Idaho Supreme Court recognized that Idaho's implied consent law, or at least the 
Court's interpretation of it, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. See State v. Arrotta, 2014 Opinion No. 137 (Dec. 18, 2014); State v. 
Wulff, 2014 Opinion No. 105 (Oct. 29, 2014). 
In his Petition, Mr. Sims alleged that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to 
file a motion to suppress the non-consensual blood draw taken at the hospital. (R., p.5.) 
Mr. Sims further alleged that his attorney's failures have "allowed me to enter a plea of 
guilty to a charge 'unknowingly and unintelligently."' (R., p.6.) Further, the 
uncontradicted evidence provided in his affidavit states that his blood was taken without 
his consent and without a warrant. (R., p.10.) Moreover Mr. Sims attested that he 
asked his attorney to file a motion to suppress and his attorney refused to file said 
motion. (R., pp.10-11.) However, had Mr. Sims' attorney kept abreast with the current 
state of the law, the attorney would have known of the McNeely decision and its direct 
applicability to Mr. Sims'. It is apparent, based upon the uncontroverted evidence in this 
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case, that Mr. Sims' raised an issue of material fact as to his trial attorney's failure to 
advise him on all relevant law and file all necessary pretrial motions. 
3. Mr. Sims Was Prejudiced By His Trial Attorney's Failures Because Had 
Mr. Sims Been Properly Advised And All Necessary Motions Filed, The 
Results From The Warrantless Blood Draw Would Have Likely Been 
Suppressed 
Had Mr. Sims trial counsel properly advised him on the current state of the law, 
he would have been successful on motion to withdraw his guilty plea and on his 
suppression motion. "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added). The uncontroverted 
evidence set forth in the Petition and its supporting affidavit is that Mr. Sims wanted his 
attorney to file a suppression motion related to warrantless blood draw results. 
(R., pp.5-6, 10-11.) 
a. There Is A Reasonable Probability Mr. Sims Would Have Been 
Allowed To Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
The United States Supreme Court opinion in McNeely was published 13 days 
after Mr. Sims entered his plea of guilty to aggravated DUI. However, because 
Mr. Sims had still not been sentenced, he could still seek to withdraw his guilty plea by 
showing a "just reason." The decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty 
plea falls within the discretion of the district court. State v. McFarland, 130 Idaho 358, 
361 (Ct. App. 1997). Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that "[a] motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea may be made only before [the] sentence is imposed or imposition of [the] 
sentence is suspended; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may 
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set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty 
plea." Id. The timing of the motion to withdraw a guilty plea affects the exercise of the 
trial court's discretion. State v. Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801 (1988). A motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea filed after sentencing can only be granted to correct a "manifest 
injustice." Id. "This strict standard is justified to insure that an accused is not 
encouraged to plead guilty to test the weight of the potential punishment and withdraw 
the plea if the sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. Ward, 135 Idaho 68 (Ct. App. 
2000 ); ( citing McFarland, 130 Idaho at 361, 941 P .2d at 333 ). 
A less rigorous standard is applied to a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed prior 
to sentencing. Ballard, 114 Idaho at 801. However, the withdrawal of a guilty plea prior 
to sentencing is not an automatic right. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 481 , 485 ( 1993 ). In 
Ward, the Idaho Court of Appeals articulated the standard for withdrawing a guilty plea 
prior to sentencing, stating: 
A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing must 
show a 'just reason' for withdrawing the guilty plea. The 'just reason' 
standard does not require that a defendant establish a constitutional 
defect in his or her guilty plea. Once the defendant has met this burden, 
the state may avoid a withdrawal of the plea by demonstrating the 
existence of prejudice to the state. The defendant's failure to present and 
support a plausible reason will dictate against granting the withdrawal, 
even absent prejudice to the prosecution . . . the district court is 
encouraged to liberally exercise its discretion in granting a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea. 
Ward, 135 Idaho at 72 (internal citations omitted). 
Here, at the time of the Mr. Sims' guilty plea, the McNeely opinion had not yet 
been published by the United States Supreme Court, so Mr. Sims was unaware of a 
potential defense he had in his case. Certainly, a viable suppression motion rises to the 
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level of a just reason for withdrawing a piea of guilty. Accordingly, Mr. Sims' guilty plea 
was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 
b. There Is A Reasonable Probability That Mr. Sims' Motion To 
Suppress Would Have Been Granted 
The failure of counsel to file a motion to suppress will satisfy the prejudice prong 
of the ineffective assistance of counsel test where the reviewing court determines that 
the evidence at issue would have been suppressed. State v. Mathews, ·J 33 Idaho 300, 
308 (1999); see also Kimme/man v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986)(finding that when 
failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is principal allegation of 
ineffectiveness, petitioner must also prove that Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious 
and there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent 
the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. at 375. 
The uncontroverted evidence in this case is that Mr. Sims blood was taken 
without a warrant and without his consent. (R., pp.5-6, 10-11.) Pursuant to McNeely 
and the line of recent Idaho Supreme Court cases, Mr. Sims motion to suppress would 
have been granted. See State v. Arrotta, 2014 Opinion No. 137 (Dec. 18, 2014); 
State v. Wulff, 2014 Opinion No. 105 (Oct. 29, 2014). Thus, Mr. Sims was prejudiced 
by his trial counsel's deficient performance. 
According, the district court erred when it dismissed Mr. Sims claim that his trial 
attorney was ineffective for failing to advise him on the relevant law an file the 
necessary motion in his case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sims respectfully requests that this Court vacated the district court's order 
dismissing his Petition and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 6th day of January, 2015. 
ERIC D. REDE ICKSEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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